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Shifting Sands: An Analysis of OPEC Under U.S. 
Antitrust and EU Competition Law and How the U.S. 
Oil Boom Might Change It All 
Christopher J. Lento∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
“Coordination and unification of policy”; “Stabilization of the 
markets”; “Ensuring an efficient and regular market supply”; “Fair 
returns for investors in industry.”1 These admirable goals of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) seem 
equally likely to appear within the various mission statements of 
governmental agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, or the EU 
Commission on Competition Law. However, they encapsulate the 
purported mission statement of an organization that is 
unquestionably illegal under both EU and U.S. law, an organization 
that commentators and experts have called “arsonists” of the global 
economy2 and “snake-oil salesmen.”3 
In September of 1960, OPEC was founded in Baghdad by five 
signatory nations: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.4 
Although OPEC currently has 12 Member Nations, membership has 
fluctuated over the years and has included countries such as Qatar, 
Indonesia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, 
Angola, and Gabon, many of which have maintained continuous 
membership, while others have suspended their membership for 
periods of time depending upon internal political circumstances.5 
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 1. Our Mission, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
[hereinafter OPEC], http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm [http: 
//perma.cc/EF8Z-QE3K] (archived Feb. 16, 2014). 
 2. Gal Luft, How to Ruin OPEC’s Birthday, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 9, 
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/09/how_to_ruin_opecs_bir 
thday [http://perma.cc/65YV-XTAV] (archived May 13, 2014.) 
 3. Jerry Taylor, Left, Right and Wrong on Energy, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 
2000, at A21. 
 4. OPEC, OPEC Statute 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.opec 
org/opec_web/static_files_project/mediadownloads/publications/OPEC_Statute.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/V5HD-CQFH] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 5. Opec: The oil cartel in profile, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2008, 10:39 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3768971.stm [http://perma.cc/L844-HNUL] 
(archived Feb. 16, 2014). 
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The OPEC Statute differentiates between the original five 
signatory countries, known as “Founder Members,” and countries 
that joined after the formation, which are known as “Full 
Members.”6 The Statute allows new countries to join OPEC as Full 
Members if accepted by a majority of three-fourths of Full 
Members, including the concurring votes of all five Founding 
Members.7 The Statute stipulates that “any country with a 
substantial net export of crude petroleum, which has fundamentally 
similar interests to those of Member Nations, may become a Full 
Member of the Organization,” provided that the voting requirements 
are met.8 Member Nations refer to OPEC as an “intergovernmental 
organization” with the goal of protecting the interests of the 
producing nations.9  
However, in an oligopolistic market such as the oil market, 
where the number of producers is limited and the actions of any one 
producer may affect the entire market; OPEC’s efforts to protect the 
interests of its Member Nations offer a glimpse of its true nature. 
The organization’s ongoing agreement to regulate production in 
order to control international oil markets and its stated purpose of 
stabilizing both prices and supply for the financial gain of its 
members bring to light that OPEC is nothing more than a cartel on a 
macro-level. Because the organization’s sole operations seem to 
consist of manipulating markets, restricting output, and fixing 
prices, the categorization of OPEC as a cartel has never been 
seriously questioned. Although its methods are unquestionably 
illegal, both U.S. and EU competition authorities have historically 
avoided measures that would be taken as a matter of course in the 
face of similar domestic, foreign corporate, or EU Member State 
violations.10 
In Part I, this Article will examine antitrust violations by OPEC 
under both U.S. and EU competition regimes. Then, in Part II, the 
Article will proceed to analyze some of the problems with asserting 
antitrust jurisdiction over OPEC in its role as a “sovereign state” and 
the differing paths taken by U.S. and EU authorities in dealing with 
OPEC, while viewing the organization as a necessary evil. Finally, 
recent advances in technology that have triggered an “oil boom” in 
North America will be examined in light of their effect on oil 
                                                                                                             
 6. OPEC, supra note 4, at 3. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. OPEC, supra note 4, at 1.  
 10. See Solutions to Competitive Problems in the Oil Industry: Hearing 
Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 34–39 (2000) [hereinafter 
Solutions] (statement of Richard G. Parker, Director, Federal Trade Commission 
Bureau of Competition). 
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imports in Part III, and the Article will discuss how these advances 
may affect OPEC’s ability to manipulate the global oil market. 
I. CLASSIFICATION OF OPEC AS A CARTEL UNDER U.S. AND EU 
COMPETITION LAW 
The classification of a “cartel,” as it is commonly used, refers to 
a formal organization of normally competing producers or 
manufacturers that formally or explicitly agree to engage in 
anticompetitive behaviors, such as fixing prices, limiting output, 
division of profits, or allocation of market share, customers, or 
territories.11 Whereas the underlying goal of competition authorities 
on a global scale is preservation of competitive forces within free 
and uninhibited markets, the behavior of cartels are distinguishable 
from lawfully competitive behavior among businesses. While 
antitrust law does not condemn businesses gaining market 
dominance through “superior skill, foresight and industry,”12 
authorities rigorously seek to proscribe formal agreements that result 
in collusive outcomes affecting both allocation of market production 
and pricing inequity. Since participating members rely on an agreed 
course of action, these agreements typically have the effect of 
eliminating competition within a specific market, which in turn 
reduces incentives to provide innovative products or services at 
competitive prices. This results in a stagnating market, with 
consumers ultimately paying higher prices for lower quality goods.13 
In an oligopolistic market, these results are often more 
pronounced, frequently resulting in what is commonly known as a 
“captive market.”14 Captive markets are characterized by potential 
consumers being forced to choose from a limited number of 
competitive suppliers, offering goods of a quality and price 
completely predetermined by the suppliers and wholly unaffected by 
competitive forces. Captive markets result in higher prices and less 
diversity for consumers, ultimately creating a “Hobson’s choice” for 
the consumer, with their only choices being to purchase what is 
available or to make no purchase at all.15 Notably, the factors that 
                                                                                                             
 11. JOHN DUFFY, ECONOMICS 136 (Jerry Bobrow ed., 1st ed. 1993). 
 12. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
 13. See MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 187–90 
(Jean-Olivier Hairault & Hubert Kempf eds., 2002). 
 14. DREW FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, DYNAMIC MODELS OF OLIGOPOLY: 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PURE AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 25 (Routledge ed., 2002). 
 15. See Charles Johnson, The Many Monopolies, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-many-monopolies 
[http://perma.cc/FE9E-WDKE] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
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give rise to an oligopolistic market are also conducive to the 
formation of cartels. Specifically, the hallmark of an oligopolistic 
market is a marketplace in which consumers are forced to deal with 
relatively few suppliers with dominant market share, high barriers to 
entry into the market by competitors, and relatively interchangeable 
products.16 Because cartels normally occur in an oligopolistic 
market, authorities are able to easily identify companies holding a 
dominant market share. However, it is usually difficult to prove that 
competitor behavior is the result of a formalized agreement, rather 
than the “success of a business which reflects only a superior 
product, a well-run business, or luck.”17 Since anticompetitive 
arrangements are illegal in most countries, and businesses involved 
in such arrangements are often subject to immense punitive fines, 
market allocation or price-fixing operations are typically well 
concealed, and the details are often never fully revealed, even after 
discovery and litigation.18 For this reason, when cartels are 
uncovered and proven, they are prosecuted vigorously, with well-
publicized punishment, fines, and penalties intended to deter other 
anti-competitive agreements.19 
Since corporations and other business entities (known as 
“private” cartels) rely on the sufferance of national and international 
governments for their existence, they are subject to jurisdiction with 
relative ease by a “host” country enforcing an anti-competitive 
regime.20 However, the very nature of OPEC poses unique 
jurisdictional challenges for competition authorities. Shielded by its 
status as an “intergovernmental” organization and the sovereign 
status of its Member Nations, OPEC openly engages in anti-
competitive behaviors that would be considered illegal under almost 
any legal regime that encourages free market competition.21 These 
behaviors obviate the need for authorities to look for collusive 
markers or patterns that would normally suggest or reveal the 
presence of a clandestine cartel. For example, it is the organization’s 
stated goal to unify petroleum policies of its members to ensure 
stability of pricing and protect the interest of its members by 
                                                                                                             
 16. DUFFY, supra note 11, at 136. 
 17. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. See CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 98 (4th ed. 2009). 
 19. See, e.g., Caroline Binham, Libor probes push cartel penalties to record 
€3bn, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 8, 2014, at 17. 
 20. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OXFORD 
MONOGRAPHS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2008). 
 21. See Solutions, supra note 10, at 38. 
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limiting output in order to maintain their collective market power.22 
OPEC imposes quota restrictions and production cuts on its 
members, ensuring a balance between supply and demand in the 
industry, and it manipulates pricing through use of a “price band 
mechanism” where fluctuations in price-per-barrel outside of a 
certain range will trigger new quota agreements.23  
OPEC frequently reduces production in order to drive up prices 
and relies on its status as a “public,” or government-sanctioned, 
cartel to shield it from legal action by other nations. Despite 
government tolerance of public cartels (e.g. labor unions—and, 
during times of economic crisis such as during the Great 
Depression, so-called “crisis cartels”),24 there is no evidence that 
public cartels are less harmful to the public welfare than private 
cartels. Further, because public cartels are governmentally 
sanctioned or enforced, they have the potential to be more effective 
and, therefore, more harmful.25 However, since the inception of 
OPEC, American and European competition authorities have 
regarded it with measured distrust, and despite strong 
anticompetitive prohibitions in both the United States and EU, the 
tremendous reliance on foreign oil on the part of both governments 
has had the effect of tying their hands. 
The United States has a long history of enforcement against 
cartels, the elimination of which helped form early U.S. competition 
law, when cartels were more commonly known as “trusts.”26 The 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 outlawed “every contract, 
                                                                                                             
 22. Edmund M. Daukoru, President, OPEC Conference, Oil Market Stability: 
The Role of OPEC (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web 
/en/994.htm [http://perma.cc/7KYA-JACB] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 23. Arturo Silva Calderon, Secretary General, Speech to the European Energy 
Foundation, The Role of OPEC in the 21st Century, Speech to the European 
Energy Foundation, (July 9, 2003), http://www.opec.org/opec_web en/918.htm 
[http://perma.cc/DC5Y-42VT] (archived May 12, 2014). 
 24. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter 
OECD], Crisis Cartels, OECD Doc. No. DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2011)20, 2 (Jan. 27, 
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu competition/international/multilateral 
2011_feb_crisis_cartels.pdf [http://perma.cc/AQ23-28VP] (archived Mar. 15, 2014) 
(submission from the European Union for the Global Forum on Competition, Feb. 
17–18, 2011). 
 25. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Address Before the TokyoAmerica Center: The Role of 
Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth (Nov. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.htm [http: 
/perma.cc/W59A-GTJZ] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 26. See Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, in 
HISTORIANS ON AMERICA 30, 33, http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271 
dwoa122709/Historians-on-America.pdf [http://perma.cc/V37-U6JY] (archived 
Mar. 15, 2014). 
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations,” which includes cartel violations such as price 
fixing, limitations on output, and customer or territory allocation.27 
The Federal Trade Commission plays a major role in regulating 
competition by enforcing provisions of the antitrust laws that 
prevent anticompetitive collusive activities, as well as the 
subsequent acquisition or abuse of market power.28 Although 
violations involving agreements between corporate competitors are 
punishable as federal crimes in the United States,29 there is no 
overarching international prohibition against cartels that exerts 
pressure on an intergovernmental organization such as OPEC. By 
any measure under U.S. antitrust law, OPEC is a cartel––a 
“conspiracy in restraint of trade, under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act,”30––and the organization’s impact on the U.S. economy has 
implications that have affected nearly every industry on a micro-
level as well as every family that relies on an automobile for 
transportation.31 OPEC’s effect on the U.S. economy has been 
calamitous at times, beginning with the 1973 oil embargo in 
response to U.S. aid to Israel after the outbreak of hostilities 
between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and 
Syria.32  
Frustrated by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, the growing 
demand for oil by the United States while maintaining 2% per year 
pricing increases, and by paying 100% price increases to buy back 
refined petroleum products that they had sold as crude, the Arab 
members of OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo against the United 
States when the U.S. began arms shipments to Israel.33 OPEC 
announced an overnight price increase of 70% and plans to 
immediately cut production by 5%, with further monthly cuts until 
                                                                                                             
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 28. Solutions, supra note 10, at 35.  
 29. 15 U.S.C § 1. 
 30. See Andrew C. Udin, Comment, Slaying Goliath: The Extraterritorial 
Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to OPEC, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001). 
 31. See Jim Snyder, Fracking Seen Robbing OPEC of Gasoline Pricing Power, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-
10/fracking-seen-robbing-opec-of-gasoline-pricing-power.html [http://perma.cc/8U 
EA-F73P] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 32. See Mark Fischetti, 40 Years after OPEC Oil Embargo, U.S. May Finally 
Get Off Imported Crude, SCI. AM. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://blogs.scientific 
american.com/observations/2013/10/16/40-years-after-opec-oil-embargo-u-s-may-
finally-get-off-imported-crude/ [http://perma.cc/PW3K-4DL6] (archived Mar. 15, 
2014). 
 33. See id. 
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their objectives were met.34 These measures had the practical effect 
of slamming the brakes on the vulnerable U.S. economy and forcing 
concessions in the form of price increases and new trade 
negotiations.35 With price controls by the government in place to 
keep prices artificially low, shortages were already a possibility in 
the face of growing U.S. consumption, but the embargo led to 
shortfalls that were both unexpected and unprecedented.36 The 
subsequent “oil shock” led to a scarcity of gasoline across the 
nation, resulting in gas station closures, rationing lines that stretched 
for miles and lasted for hours, and alternate fuel days for consumers 
who could only buy fuel on days corresponding to whether their 
license plate ended with odd or even numbers.37 Although the 
embargo is now viewed as only the triggering mechanism for a 
shortage due primarily to price controls, it remains the most visible 
and painful reminder of OPEC’s first decision to use its leverage 
over the production of oil in a punitive way and at the same time 
stimulate real income for the producing Member Nations. 
Under EU law, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union prohibits cartels and other agreements that could disrupt free 
competition in the EU’s common market.38 Article 101 of the Treaty 
prohibits cartels by declaring that they are incompatible with the 
common market and automatically voids “all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market.”39 The Article 
further specifies a prohibition against agreements that: (1) set the 
price at which goods, services, or commodities will be bought or 
sold, or the conditions under which buying or selling will occur; (2) 
set limits on the amount of goods produced or sold; (3) divide up a 
market between competitors; (4) place certain trading parties at a 
competitive disadvantage by applying different conditions to the 
                                                                                                             
 34. MARK WESTON, PROPHETS AND PRINCES: SAUDI ARABIA FROM 
MUHAMMAD TO THE PRESENT, 217 (2008). 
 35. William. D. Smith, Iranian Oil Price Quadruples, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
1973, at 1, 64. 
 36. Fischetti, supra note 32.  
 37. Chris Isidore, A return to gas lines and rationing? Current oil-price run 
churns up memories of gasoline rationing and long waits on gas lines, CNN 
MONEY (Oct. 13, 2004, 1:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/10/12/news 
/economy/gas_lines/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Q65C-Q22J] (archived Feb. 16, 
2014). 
 38. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union tit. VII, ch. 1, § 1, art. 101, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 
88 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 39. Id. 
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same type of transactions; or (5) make acceptance of contracts 
subject to the acceptance of supplementary obligations with no 
connection to the original contracts.40 Although there are limited 
exceptions when agreements contribute to the improvement or 
distribution of goods or the promotion of technical or economic 
progress, cartels are generally illegal under EU competition law, and 
the European Commission typically imposes heavy fines on 
companies involved in a cartel.41 Further, since the driving principle 
behind the European Union is the establishment of a centralized 
common market among all of the independent member states,42 
“public” cartels pose a unique risk of rendering EU competition law 
ineffective. In order to address this, “public” cartels that are 
sanctioned by Member States are specifically addressed in the treaty 
governing the functioning of the European Union.43 
Another unique feature of EU competition law specifically 
addresses the secretive nature of cartels: the doctrine of “leniency,” 
which encourages cartel members to provide evidence of the cartel’s 
existence in exchange for a waiver of any future fines imposed.44 
With fines ranging into the hundreds of millions of Euros, the 
leniency policy is a strong incentive for cartel members to cooperate 
with the EU in revealing the existence of what is considered one of 
the “most serious violations of antitrust rules.”45 However, the open 
actions of OPEC negate the need for application of any method of 
discovering surreptitious agreements in the European Union, just as 
it negates this need in the United States. It is clear that OPEC is as 
much a cartel under EU law as it is under the U.S. legal regime.46 
However, in spite of vigorous prosecution of cartels on both a 
private and public level by the European Commission, the EU has 
joined the United States in its abstention from asserting competition 
law against OPEC’s distortion of the world oil market. 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. 
 41. THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N 5 
(2013), http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/competition_en.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/3N4H-HW4F] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 42. The history of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://Europa 
.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm [http://perma.cc/D3KE-M3R6] (archived 
Mar. 15, 2014) (see 1980-1989, The changing face of Europe—the fall of the 
Berlin Wall).  
 43. See TFEU, supra note 38, art. 107. 
 44. See Press Release, European Union, Commission Adopts New Leniency 
Policy For Companies Which Give Information On Cartels (Feb. 13, 2002), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-247_en.htm [http://perma 
.cc/U59Y-VRCK] (archived Feb. 16, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See TFEU, supra note 38, art. 101. 
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II. LIMITIATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF U.S. AND EU 
COMPETITION LAW OVER OPEC  
Both the United States and European Union have failed to 
seriously challenge OPEC for several fundamental reasons, the 
principle of which is an intrinsic reliance on the availability of 
affordable oil to drive their respective economies.47 While this 
concept is elemental, it cannot be stressed enough in light of the fact 
that demand for oil is increasing even in the face of massive efforts 
to reduce reliance on this type of fuel.48 
The United States relies on fossil fuels to provide approximately 
80% of its energy, including nearly two-thirds of its electricity and 
virtually all of its transportation fuels.49 Even with aggressive 
development and deployment of new renewable and nuclear 
technologies, it is likely that reliance on fossil fuels to power an 
expanding economy will actually increase, at least over the next two 
decades.50 With a population recently exceeding 500 million 
citizens,51 the European Union is also “heavily dependent” on oil, 
particularly for use in the transport sector and for domestic and 
industrial use in some Member States.52 Although consumption has 
declined somewhat in the last few years, the European Union still 
ranks as one of the top consumers of oil in the world, with an 
estimated 12.7 million barrels per day consumed in 2012.53 
                                                                                                             
 47. See, e.g., William L. Watts, House takes aim at OPEC, WALL ST. J.: 
MARKET WATCH (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:28 PM), http://www.marketwatch 
.com/story/house-votes-to-strip-opecs-antitrust-immunity [http://perma.cc/U5FG-
G6EN] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 48. See Jorn Madslien, Stability fears rise as oil reliance grows, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2004, 12:00 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3953907.stm 
[http://perma.cc/5859-UXT9] (archived Feb. 16, 2014). 
 49. See Primary Energy Consumption by Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Feb. 2014), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/pages/sec1_7.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/LU4J-3QJB] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). 
 50. See Duncan Clark, Why can’t we quit fossil fuels?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
17, 2013, 12:49 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/17/why-
cant-we-give-up-fossil-fuels [http://perma.cc/XCD3-SRH7] (archived Mar. 15, 
2014). 
 51. Matej Hruska, EU Population Tops 500 Million, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 29, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content 
/jul2010/gb20100729_623637.htm [http://perma.cc/X83J-FMAJ] (archived Mar. 
15, 2014). 
 52. Oil and its derivatives, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu 
/competition/sectors/energy/oil/oil_en.html [http://perma.cc/MDY8-FJNL] (archived 
Mar. 15, 2014). 
 53. BRITISH PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, 11 
(2013), http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review 
_of _world_energy_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/FC7A-TJ5G] (archived May 12, 
2014).  
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In both cases, massive dependence on oil poses unique problems 
when addressing the application of U.S. or EU antitrust law against 
OPEC. With economies and industries driven by oil, OPEC has the 
power to bring both powers to their knees if it were to decide to 
initiate another embargo, which would cause oil prices to 
skyrocket.54 In the case of the European Union, OPEC has also used 
the threat of limiting production if it discovered the European Union 
using its own emergency reserves of oil to make oil more affordable 
for its citizens.55 At its summit in 2000, after the United States 
opened its strategic reserves to keep prices low, OPEC warned it 
would cut production to drive up prices; in doing so, OPEC was 
aiming to balance any reductions due to a similar EU utilization of 
its strategic reserves.56  
Since then, the United States has maintained a tenuous 
relationship with OPEC. Despite the recent dramatic increase in 
shale oil production, the United States imported over 40% of the oil 
consumed in 2012, with 28% of those imports coming from 
producers in the Persian Gulf. 57 Although most U.S. imports were 
from the Western Hemisphere, 9% were from Venezuela and 
another 13% were from Saudi Arabia, both of whom are OPEC 
members.58 In sum, approximately 28% of all the oil imported into 
the U.S. in 2012 was from Persian Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, many 
of which are OPEC Member Nations.59  
The United States’ dependence on foreign oil has historically led 
to an enormous reliance on the goodwill of an organization that is 
per se illegal under U.S. antitrust law, but antitrust authorities are 
conspicuously quiet when it comes to confronting OPEC’s market 
controls and manipulations. In the last few decades, there have been 
suggestions that the United States may have the means to assert 
subject-matter jurisdiction over OPEC and should move towards 
pursuing claims against the organization despite the dismissal of an 
                                                                                                             
 54. See Ken Blackwell, Forty Years of OPEC Manipulation, THE DAILY 
CALLER (Oct. 15, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/15/forty-years-
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earlier attempt to assert jurisdiction in 1981.60 There, the court held 
that OPEC was shielded from jurisdiction because it was acting in 
its governmental capacity when it regulated production.61 However, 
in 1993, this earlier contention was cast into doubt by Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. California, in which the Supreme Court ruled that 
the Sherman Act could be applied to the acts of foreign corporations 
committed in foreign countries “that were meant to produce and did 
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States,” which 
OPEC’s actions consistently do.62 
Increasing gasoline prices and higher prices for oil used by 
industry, such as airplane and jet fuel, have also led to legislative 
pressure from both the Senate and House. In April 2000, and again 
in April 2001, Senator Arlen Specter sent letters to both President 
Clinton and President Bush urging litigation against OPEC.63 
Senator Specter also argued in front of Congress on June 22, 2005, 
urging the legislature to find that OPEC’s immunity from 
jurisdiction be nullified.64  
In the past, OPEC’s immunity from suit sprung from its 
classification as a governmental entity, which would place it under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, providing that a 
foreign defendant shall be immune from suit in any federal or state 
court if the defendant qualifies as a “Foreign State” and unless a 
statutory exception to immunity applies.65 However, Senator Specter 
argued against the courts, finding that OPEC Members’ cooperation 
to fix pricing was a “governmental activity” as opposed to 
“commercial activity” and suggested that OPEC should be subject to 
suit in either U.S. federal court or the International Court of Justice 
at the Hague.66 In June of 2005, a day before the Senator spoke, the 
Senate passed Senate Bill 555 by voice vote, also known as the “No 
Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2005,” which codified 
the ability to proceed against OPEC under antitrust laws.67 
Ultimately, however, U.S. administrations remained cold to the idea 
of sanctions or enforcement against OPEC even after further 
congressional demands for action. For example, the House of 
Representatives passed their version of the “No Oil Producing and 
Exporting Cartels Act” by a supermajority vote of 345–72 in May 
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2007, in the face of the direct threat of veto by then President 
George W. Bush.68 These bills seemingly would provide the 
statutory exception that a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act claim 
requires, which would allow federal courts to hear claims against 
OPEC.69 Notwithstanding these attempts by Congress, there has 
been no action to pursue the organization thus far, leaving litigation 
as the one of the few avenues by which to challenge to OPEC 
although recent rulings may have foreclosed this as a viable option 
as well. In 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of a major challenge to OPEC’s antitrust violations.70 In 
Spectrum Stores, et al. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., et al., a group of 
gasoline retailers brought class actions against oil companies owned 
by OPEC Member Nations, alleging that the national oil companies 
conspired with OPEC to fix crude oil prices in the United States 
through production limits.71 Although the suit was brought against 
oil production companies rather than the OPEC Member Nations 
themselves, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the district 
court under both the political question and act of state doctrines.72 
The Court of Appeals held that matters raised in the complaints 
“effectively challenge the structure of OPEC and its relation to the 
worldwide production of petroleum”.73 Citing the political question 
doctrine, the Court concluded that since the complaint implicated 
matters of foreign policy, which are in the purview of the executive 
and legislative branches, it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
claims.74 Finally, citing the act of state doctrine, the Court of 
Appeals held that adjudication of the suit would call into question 
the acts of foreign governments concerning their natural resources, 
which was outside the sphere of the Judicial Branch.75  
In the absence of a viable challenge to OPEC, the United States’ 
reliance on imported oil has maintained a high level of dependence 
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on many countries that are avowed enemies of U.S. interests.76 
Unlike sources such as Mexico and Canada, which along with Saudi 
Arabia are among the top three oil exporters to the United States, 
many OPEC Member Nations are not aligned with the United States 
ideologically and cannot be expected to be particularly sympathetic 
to fluctuations in the U.S. economy.77 For example, since the price-
per-barrel of oil is tied to the U.S. dollar, any decline in the value of 
the dollar has often led OPEC members to call for price increases in 
the price-per-barrel in order make up for any shortfall in revenues 
while, at the same time, exceeding their self-imposed quotas to 
bolster any loss of revenues that the member nations are 
experiencing.78 Price increases such as this force the United States to 
spend more on imports while increasing the national debt, which in 
turn lengthens the time it will take for the economy to recover and 
the dollar’s value to rebound from normal trading fluctuations in the 
world’s currency markets.79 While this is damaging in a concrete 
sense, it is mitigated by the fact that the price of oil is pinned to the 
dollar, and the normal standards of economics are skewed as far as 
they pertain to the United States. Most oil importing countries are 
forced to reserve capital in the form of U.S. dollars in order to 
maintain imports at the necessary levels, and oil exporting countries 
similarly hold, as their currency reserve, billions in U.S. dollars, the 
currency in which they are paid.80 This reservation of reserve capital 
in U.S. dollars, in turn, creates a constant upwards pressure on the 
dollar, independent of economic conditions within the United States; 
this upward pressure on the dollar allows the United States to 
discount bond rates to other countries.81 Because of these discounted 
bond rates, oil exporters and producers are able to invest profits 
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made on oil straight back into the U.S. economy, with virtually zero 
currency risk. This allows the United States to run higher, and 
virtually permanent, trade deficits at a more sustainable level than 
most other countries and also maintains relatively low prices on 
imported goods.82 Oil producing states, such as Venezuela and Iran, 
that are ideologically opposed to the United States have a vested 
interest in seeing a weaker dollar and have pushed for oil to be 
priced in other currencies.83  
Undoubtedly, it is in the United States’ interest to maintain the 
price of oil in U.S. dollars, and prosecuting OPEC under 
international or federal law would be sure to alienate Member 
Nations with the potential to affect the currency to which oil is 
pinned.84 Whether this is a valid reason for the U.S. restraint, the 
Federal Trade Commission has maintained two major reasons for 
non-enforcement against OPEC: the foreign sovereign immunity 
doctrine, which formed the basis of Senator Specter’s challenge as 
discussed above, and the act of state doctrine, which similarly 
declares that a U.S. court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive 
dispute that would require the court to judge the legality of the 
sovereign act of a foreign state.85 Similarly, although the European 
Union takes a strict view of cartels, extraterritorial application of EU 
competition law may be fundamentally limited by the treaty that 
establishes the role of the EU competition law itself. 
In addition, since EU competition law focuses on trade between 
EU member states in furtherance of its goal of common market 
integration, application of treaty provisions to nations or states that 
are not members seems to leave the European Commission with a 
lack of meaningful enforcement options. Article 101 of the Treaty 
does not seem to contemplate governmental bodies in its applicable 
restrictions of “undertakings” when it refers to “companies,” and 
European courts have consistently held that the European 
Commission’s competition rules do not apply to conduct in the 
exercise of official authority or when an organization is acting as a 
public authority.86  
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The central role of the EU is to serve as an intergovernmental 
organization,87 and as such, the sovereignty of its Member States 
plays a central role in the cohesiveness of the union. Further, 
although the EU’s general approach emphasizes the supremacy of 
intergovernmental law, its approach to conflict encourages 
cooperation rather than punitive measures.88 An example of this is 
the “leniency policy” discussed above, which, although it is one of 
the strongest tools used by the EU in competition law, it is also 
indicative of a recurring fundamental paradigm of cooperation. 
Similarly, the European Union appears to emphasize cooperation in 
its approach to OPEC. For example, in the first annual joint 
ministerial meeting in 2005, both the European Union and OPEC 
mutually expressed that they wanted to “deepen ties” after soaring 
oil prices prompted economists to cut growth forecasts for parts of 
Europe.89 OPEC members, who were producing close to capacity, 
sought EU investment to increase their potential output, and in a 
joint statement, both powers indicated the intention to pursue 
“market stability, with reasonable prices that are consistent with the 
need for healthy economic growth and steady revenue streams for 
producing countries.”90  
Recently, the 14th Annual International Oil Summit, held in 
April of 2013, addressed issues such as global energy “inter-
dependence,” long term fossil fuel prospects, and the importance of 
“stable and fair” pricing.91 Whether these meetings have succeeded 
in maintaining the stability of oil prices within the EU is debatable. 
EU press releases justify the meetings, however, as a “continued 
dialogue and exchanges of views,” a dialogue elemental to 
improving understanding among all parties; as a result, the meetings 
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were “in line with the mutual interests of supporting oil market 
stability and predictability, for the benefit of the world at large.”92  
The mission statement contained within the OPEC Statute itself 
suggests that securing “an efficient, economic and regular supply of 
petroleum to customers” is one of the hallmarks of an organization 
that once used its power over the global oil market to send 
economies into cycles of inflation and recession.93 With an ongoing 
dialogue and the tendency of the European Union to engage in 
cooperative relationship building, the EU is unlikely to initiate any 
maneuvers toward prosecution of OPEC as an “agreement in 
restraint of trade,” and the European Union’s ability to successfully 
do so within the constraints of the treaty’s definition of 
“undertakings” is doubtful. 
Both the United States and the European Union face formidable 
challenges in asserting an effective claim against OPEC, and even if 
successful, would need to consider the relevance of any international 
laws regarding sovereign immunities. Practical legal issues also 
include the nature of the jurisdiction to be asserted over OPEC, how 
a factual investigation could be conducted with respect to 
documents and witnesses located outside the United States, and the 
nature and enforceability of remedies, as judgments made against 
OPEC are bound to be politically counter-productive and 
problematic, with immediate retaliatory measures. 
This is not to suggest that OPEC itself has not evolved since the 
1970s when it was seen as fairly militant and willing to wield its 
power to declare embargoes that would throw economies around the 
world into downward spirals. In the past few decades, OPEC’s 
recurring theme, as reflected in its mission statement, has been 
“stabilization of the markets,” attempting to achieve a delicate 
balance between keeping oil prices high enough to produce a 
constant flow of income for Member Nations yet low enough to 
discourage consumers from diverting significant revenues into 
alternative sources of energy.94 OPEC has largely succeeded, 
maintaining oil pricing at a level that has allowed for global 
economic growth while meeting the economic needs of its Member 
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Nations.95 This has led to a strange dichotomy: on one hand, OPEC 
can be compared to a corporation, acting in a predictable way to 
maximize income for its “shareholders”—that is, its Member 
Nations. On the other hand, the fact that the global oil market is 
regulated by a loose association of countries that are often 
ideologically opposed to U.S. interests has led every U.S. President 
since Nixon to have promised, and failed, to reduce U.S. 
dependence on foreign oil.96  
In the face of an ever-increasing global appetite for oil, OPEC 
has been viewed as a necessary evil, an organization that is outside 
the direct reach of U.S. and EU law, but one that both countries have 
relied on over time to stabilize oil prices and promote global 
economic growth.97 In any case, both the United States and the 
European Union have shown a strong disinclination to prosecute 
OPEC due to both practical and political reasons, with the European 
Union suffering from the additional hurdle of strict interpretation of 
its competition law, which does not currently contemplate suits 
against sovereign states.98 Now, and for the foreseeable future, 
notwithstanding a major shift in the political and economic climate, 
the viability of an antitrust suit being brought against OPEC is 
negligible. 
III. HOW ECONOMICS MAY SUCCEED WHERE LAW HAS FAILED  
For nearly half a century, against the backdrop of this uneasy, 
tenuous relationship between U.S. and EU consumers and Middle 
East producers, OPEC has maintained a nearly unassailable position 
as an oil “superpower.” As recently as 2004, commentators were 
suggesting that “OPEC’s hold on the oil market, and thus on the 
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world economy, looks set to grow sharply in the coming decades.”99 
However, a series of random factors have seemingly conspired to 
undermine OPEC’s stranglehold on the world’s oil market and 
reduce its ability to use its oil production capabilities as a tool of 
political and financial coercion. These factors have inspired a 
variety of reactions, from elation on the part of conservative 
“hawks” heralding the eventual irrelevancy of OPEC, to uneasiness 
on the part of political leaders in Arab countries that depend on oil 
revenues to maintain political and economic stability.100 Whether 
OPEC is simply diminishing in stature or is in full-scale decline, the 
situation has prompted leaders of OPEC Member Nations to take 
notice.101 
While OPEC may not ever be completely irrelevant, as some 
commentators have suggested, it is unlikely that OPEC will be able 
to exert the almost unfettered control over oil prices that it has in the 
past. The most likely scenario is that the simple rules of economics 
will accomplish what decades of antitrust law has failed to do: 
reduce OPEC from a market regulator and cartel to a simple market 
participant competing against other oil producers for market share.  
When examined as a whole, the effect of these individual events 
is almost uncanny in its cumulative ability to systematically and 
rapidly strip away power and influence that OPEC has fought for 
decades to build and maintain. The event that has seemingly had the 
greatest effect on OPEC’s market share is the series of recent 
technological advances leading to an unprecedented shift in North 
American access to, and production of, shale oil and gas.102 This 
“shale oil boom” was entirely unexpected; as recently as 2007, 
skyrocketing demand from China and India for oil led the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) to issue warnings that global 
demand was increasing in the face of supply shortfalls and urging 
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oil exporting countries to increase production in the face of then 
record high prices.103 
Noting that “solving energy problems is a global responsibility 
that demands action by all countries,” the IEA explained that, as 
need for oil imports continued to grow and supplies leveled off in 
many industrialized nations, the world would become increasingly 
reliant on a smaller number of oil-exporting countries, such as the 
Middle East.104 With economic growth in China and India alone 
accounting for a 70% increase in energy demand over the previous 
two years, the Member Nations of OPEC were positioned to adjust 
prices upwards, with the IEA predicting enormous increases in the 
price-per-barrel in the face of current production.105 However, 
OPEC was kept in check by the surprising rise in Russian oil 
production, which was a mitigating factor that functioned to 
moderate prices even in the face of exploding demand.106 At that 
time, Russian production levels almost rebounded to their Soviet-era 
all-time high of 11.4 million barrels per day, and the country rivaled 
Saudi Arabia as the world’s top producer.107 While the market was 
kept in check by Russian production, technological developments in 
enhanced oil recovery techniques, such as advances in hydraulic 
fracturing, led to the beginning of a meteoric rise in North American 
production, which made formerly non-recoverable oil accessible.108  
These technological advances, combined with state-of-the art 
equipment and vast shale deposits, have led the IEA to predict that 
U.S. production will surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia, making the 
United States the world’s top oil producer by 2015.109 Nearly half of 
a century of presidential campaign promises notwithstanding, amid 
booming output from shale formations, the IEA noted that the 
United States will be close to energy self-sufficiency within the next 
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two decades.110 In spite of declining production in the Middle East 
and Russia, economists for IEA have stated that they do not expect 
the United States to continue as the world’s top producer beyond the 
2020s, after which U.S. production will eventually plateau and 
decline.111 Further, as aging production infrastructure in OPEC 
Member Nations is replaced and production technology catches up, 
Middle East oil may again regain dominance. However, it has also 
been suggested that replication of skyrocketing U.S. production may 
be more difficult than it appears.112 A recent study has noted that the 
United States has access to 60% of the global availability of drilling 
rigs; moreover, the study revealed that 95% of U.S. drilling rigs can 
perform horizontal drilling, allowing for hydraulic fracturing at a 
level of intensity that may be impossible for other countries to 
achieve in the short term.113 The boom in U.S production, followed 
closely by increases in Canadian production, has led other oil-
producing countries to reevaluate their own production capabilities. 
Russia, currently at its production limit due to aging infrastructure 
and exhaustion of existing oil fields, is hoping that new horizontal 
technologies may result in a renaissance for the country’s oil 
industry.114 
The availability of the North American shale oil has reduced 
global demand for Middle East oil to the extent that Middle East 
politicians have expressed concern. As recently as July 2013, Saudi 
Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal said demand for oil from OPEC 
Member Nations states was “in clear and continuous decline” and 
noted Saudi Arabia’s continuing reliance on oil estimated to 
comprise up to 92% of the country’s budget.115 Aside from simply 
expressing concern, OPEC members may have taken more direct 
measures to counter the effects of the U.S. energy boom. Amid 
concerns over the safety of hydraulic fracturing, the controversial 
method of production that is responsible for vast increases in oil and 
gas recovery, a 2012 film highlighting the dangers of the hydraulic 
fracturing process was revealed to have received financing from the 
United Arab Emirates, a member of OPEC and the world’s third-
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largest oil exporter.116 Critics of the film have contended that the 
UAE was “trying to drum up opposition to more U.S. oil 
production, which could compete with its crude exports.”117  
OPEC itself has been forced to downgrade its economic 
prospects, forecasting a global decline in demand for its oil, with a 
corresponding reduction in production.118 However, reductions in 
demand by the United States have been mitigated by increases in 
demand by China and India as noted above, with China overtaking 
America as the largest buyer of oil on the international markets in 
September of 2013.119 Nevertheless, even with falling Western 
demand, OPEC’s reliance on demand from China may be misplaced 
should tensions break out in the Middle East. China’s expanding 
economy and growing demand for resources require an increasing 
supply but stability of the supply chain may be equally important. 
This has led China to look to Canada as a potential supplier of crude 
oil.120  
China is Canada’s second biggest trading partner behind the 
United States, and although Canada currently exports an estimated 
99% of their energy products to the United States, this may be 
changing shortly.121 Costly delays in the construction of a massive 
pipeline between the Alberta sands oil fields may change Canadian 
oil export patterns. This pipeline, known as the Keystone XL 
Pipeline, would run from Edmonton, the “nerve center” of Canada’s 
massive oil sands, down through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, ending in Houston, and would 
provide the United States with a steady supply of affordable oil from 
a friendly trading partner that has growing production 
capabilities.122 However, resistance from the environmental lobby 
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has mired the crucial project in a contentious debate, and pressure 
on legislators has led to costly regulatory delays.123 While the 
United States has gone back and forth over whether to construct the 
pipeline, China has expressed a willingness to pay for construction 
of the “Northern Gateway Pipeline,” a proposed pipeline between 
Alberta’s oil sands to coastal British Columbia, from which oil 
could be sent directly across the Pacific to supply China’s growing 
demand.124  
The Canadian government has expressed interest in increasing 
trade with China, and delays in the Keystone XL pipeline approval 
may provide the impetus to begin diverting oil from the United 
States to China.125 China has invested billions in Canadian oil and 
gas projects and in Canadian oil companies such as Syncrude, 
Athabasca Oil Sands, and Penn West Energy.126 Securing access to 
Canadian oil would be a crucial, strategic victory for China because 
of the ongoing instability in the Middle East. As of 2010, roughly 
half of China’s imported oil arrived from the Middle East, including 
oil from countries with declining outputs or those that are classified 
as inherently unstable, such as Libya and Iraq.127  
Notwithstanding political instability of the producing countries 
themselves, transport of Middle East oil is also a problem for China. 
A large percentage of oil exported to Asia must pass through the 
Strait of Hormuz, a narrow strait between the Gulf of Oman and the 
Persian Gulf, which is the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to 
the open ocean.128 With Iran on one side and the United Arab 
Emirates on the other (both of which are OPEC Member Nations), 
the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically 
important oil transit routes.129 According to a 2011 report by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 20% of the world’s 
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crude oil and about 35% of petroleum traded by sea passed through 
this route in 2011 alone.130 Of this amount, roughly 85% of these 
crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South 
Korea, and China being the largest destinations.131 With such an 
important passage located in a region of ongoing political instability, 
China oil imports are exposed to a significant risk: as recently as 
2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to 
increased UN sanctions sparked by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
technology and again in response to a recent EU oil embargo of 
Iran.132  
In the future, increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil may also 
have diplomatic implications for China-U.S. relations. Increasing 
U.S. energy independence may make goodwill on the part of the 
Middle East strategically dispensable for the United States, allowing 
more freedom to take diplomatic actions that further U.S. interests 
but indirectly damage Chinese interests. For example, lessening 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil may free the United States from 
restraints it has been under in dealing with unfriendly Middle 
Eastern countries, making it more willing to disrupt oil output in 
times of conflict at little risk to its own supply. However, China’s 
increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil at a time of decreasing 
U.S. reliance may leave China more susceptible to diplomatic 
pressure by the United States if the United States were to support 
regime change or use sanctions against a politically unfriendly 
Middle Eastern country in order to gain leverage over China. 
Further, the presence and influence of the United States in the 
Middle East may be a factor in the region’s stability. Although 
China is now the single greatest purchaser of Middle Eastern oil, a 
United States withdrawal from the Middle East may bring about 
even more political instability with which China is ill equipped to 
handle.133 Securing access to Canadian oil would allow China to 
mitigate both the risks of oil transportation disruptions and its 
increasing reliance on a politically unstable region; compared with 
other sources of oil, Canada would be a stable, reliable supplier that 
would help China satisfy its growing demand. Further, China’s 
increased reliance in Canadian oil would weaken OPEC’s control of 
the oil market. 
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IV. OPEC’S EFFECTIVENESS AS A MARKET PARTICIPANT RATHER 
THAN AS A MARKET REGULATOR  
As noted above, while the explosive growth in the U.S. oil 
market may not reduce OPEC to a state of irrelevance in the world 
oil market, it will certainly not have the control over the market it 
has exercised in the past. That alone may be problematic for an 
organization that imposes production limits on its Member Nations 
in order to control pricing. If OPEC were to lose its ability to set 
market prices by limiting production, the benefits enjoyed by 
Member Nations would disappear; it would retain the weaknesses of 
a cartel without corresponding benefits. Further, the weaknesses in 
this case would be more pronounced for Member Nations that have, 
until recently, enjoyed a steady stream of oil profits flowing into 
their economies.  
One major problem for the organization is that it is made up of 
independent sovereign nations. Additionally, oil production aside, 
each nation has different means of promoting economic growth and 
diversification of industry. Each Member Nation has different 
trading partners, geographic boundaries, and barriers to trade, and 
many have different cultures, languages, and monetary systems. For 
example, aside from oil production, Nigeria, Iran, and Venezuela are 
vastly different, with different political, religious, and social 
paradigms. While each nation undoubtedly counts on oil revenues, 
some countries may have greater natural resources, domestic 
production capabilities, or alternate revenue streams that they use to 
fund their economies. Member Nations with diversified industries 
and economies will undoubtedly be able to handle fluctuations in oil 
prices better than countries that count on oil revenues to fund the 
majority of their national budget. However, poorer Member Nations 
that have relied on oil revenues without concurrent diversification of 
their economies, or those that have failed to invest in infrastructure 
or generation of employment opportunities, may be unable to 
maintain sustainable economic growth due to future fluctuations in 
oil revenues.134  
The governments of poor Member Nations may be completely 
dependent on oil export revenues to fund their economies, a large 
part of which may be government and social programs, and a certain 
percentage of oil revenues may be diverted to subsidies for poor 
citizens. OPEC Member Nations generally need oil to remain at a 
certain price-per-barrel to fund their economies, which is known as 
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the “fiscal break-even price.”135 For example, as of 2013, Saudi 
Arabia had a fiscal break-even cost of $98 U.S. dollars per barrel, 
while Ecuador required oil to be priced at $121 U.S. dollars per 
barrel.136 Iran required the highest cost per barrel at $144.137 OPEC 
Member Nations may depend completely on oil revenues to fund 
social programs, and with rising populations, the Member Nations 
find that they need higher oil prices each year just to make their 
budgets balance.138  
With OPEC able to regulate oil pricing through market 
manipulation, the revenue needs of the Member Nations may 
consistently be met. However, when forced to compete on the open 
market, Member Nations that have not developed a strong economy 
and a sound tax base may be unable to maintain their current 
expenditures. In the wake of the 2010 demonstrations, civil 
uprisings, and regime changes known as the “Arab Spring,”139 
leaders across the Middle East may have cause for concern if 
fluctuating oil prices lead to underfunding of social programs in the 
face of high unemployment and limited economic opportunity.  
With the ability to control oil prices, the Member Nations may 
find membership in OPEC to be a benefit that they cannot forego, 
but without that benefit, there may be little reason to abide by OPEC 
production limits. As supply from non-OPEC oil producers 
increases to meet global demand, OPEC will have a diminishing 
role in market pricing, and the normal economics of supply and 
demand may take over. If unforeseen events cause global demand to 
level out or decrease, the resulting over-supply of the market would 
put a downward pressure on the price of oil. In this case, individual 
OPEC member nations would have no choice but to ignore 
production limits in order to make up for profit shortfalls if the price 
of oil falls below their individual fiscal break-even price.  
In the event oil prices do fall that low, OPEC Members would 
have zero incentive to abide by production limits (which typically 
drive the price of oil upwards) because any supply shortfalls would 
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be covered by non-OPEC producers. At that point, it is likely that 
collusive cartel behavior would be abandoned entirely because the 
inherent collusion for joint-profit maximization means that each 
cartel participant is restrained from competing against other cartel 
members in order to maximize individual profits.140 Once OPEC 
loses the ability to regulate global oil prices through production 
limits and price fixing, individual Member Nations have no 
incentive to abide by output restrictions and may in fact have no 
choice but to ignore them.  
Further, the explosion in U.S. production has differing effects on 
the various Member Nations of OPEC. For example, Nigerian oil 
exports have been directly affected by the spike in U.S. domestic 
production because the oil being produced from the U.S. shale plays 
is the highly prized “light, sweet crude” that Nigeria has historically 
exported to the United States.141 Since July 2010, the United States, 
once Nigeria’s biggest customer, has cut imports from more than 1 
million barrels a day to 543,000 barrells as of October 2012.142 
Angola, another OPEC Member Nation, finds itself in a similar 
situation, with its market in the United States cut in half to 200,000 
barrels a day, down from an average of 513,000 barrells in 2008.143 
Experts are predicting that, before mid-2014, the United States and 
Canada will stop importing light, sweet crude from West Africa 
altogether.144 Algeria, another OPEC member, has also seen its 
exports of light, sweet crude to the United States decline by about 
half, but it produces a number of different types of crude oil that it 
has historically sold to China.145 Although Algeria has an 
established market within China and other Asian consumer 
countries, it may now face competition in those countries from 
Nigeria and Angola, and the resulting influx of light, sweet crude 
from West Africa has the potential to exert a downward pressure on 
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prices.146 Even when abiding by OPEC production limits, Nigeria 
and Angola are now finding themselves with a surplus of oil,147 
which creates an incentive to compete against fellow OPEC 
Member Algeria in order to gain a foothold into the Chinese market. 
This is one of the primary weaknesses of cartels: individual 
members may attempt to garner a larger share of the market and 
earn larger profits by undercutting the cartel itself. Once cartel 
members begin competing against each other, the cartel agreement 
has the potential to be completely undermined by sellers who may 
attempt to quickly capture a large share of the market by discounting 
their price.148 
CONCLUSION 
It is unclear whether the meteoric expansion of U.S. oil 
production will result in the end of OPEC’s role as an unconstrained 
cartel with stranglehold on the global economy or merely result in a 
temporary decrease in stature—not a “cause for worry,” as stated by 
one OPEC delegate.149 Currently, it appears that individual Member 
Nations’ reactions to coming market fluctuations will determine 
whether economic changes leave OPEC a cartel in name only. 
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